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Abstract
We present a convex optimization to reduce the impact of sensor falsification attacks in linear time invariant systems
controlled by observer-based feedback. We accomplish this by finding optimal observer and controller gain matrices that
minimize the size of the reachable set of attack-induced states. To avoid trivial solutions, we integrate a covariance-based
‖H‖2 closed-loop performance constraint, for which we develop a novel linearization for this typically nonlinear, non-convex
problem. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this linear matrix inequality framework through a numerical case study.
Key words: LMI, reachable set, security, robust control.
1 Introduction
A growing awareness of security concerns in automated
physical processes has increased interest in our ability to
quantify the impact of would-be attackers. Work along
these lines imposes a detector to raise alerts when sensor
measurements do not fall in line with model-based pre-
dictions, thus constraining what an attacker can do with-
out being discovered [8,7,5]. The tuning of such detectors
is a balancing act between increasing the sensitivity to
attacks while reducing the number of false alarms (alerts
raised during normal operation) [9]. The next clear step
in this direction of research is to then minimize this
impact through careful control system design. Initially
work used the distance (norm) that an attacker could
drive the state as a proxy for impact [9,13], however, ul-
timately the reachable set provides important informa-
tion about which components of a system are effected
more than others and can inform whether the attacked
state might reach dangerous regions of state space [10].
The quantification, or analysis, studies have often used
ellipsoidal bounds on the actual attack-induced reach-
able set achieved either through iterative methods [8]
or the satisfaction of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs)
[5,10]. The latter extends gracefully to optimization to
address the design question, although doing so often re-
? The authors are with the Departments of Mechanical and
Systems Engineering at the University of Texas at Dallas.
Email addresses: nxh150030@utdallas.edu (Navid
Hashemi), jruths@utdallas.edu (Justin Ruths).
quires re-linearizing the inequalities with respect to the
new design variables.
In this paper, we leverage past work on quantification of
ellipsoidal bounds on the attack-induced reachable set
to design the observer and controller gain matrices to
minimize the ellipsoidal bound (and thus the reachable
set) when a linear time invariant system is controlled
with estimate-based feedback. As has been pointed out
(see, e.g., [11,10]), it is important to pair a security min-
imization with a constraint on closed-loop performance,
otherwise a trivial solution exists to disconnect the feed-
back loop and thus cut off the effect of the attack on
the system state. Here we specify an output covariance
constrained (OCC) ‖H‖2 performance [12], which takes
into account the covariance of the noise, unlike other
distribution-agnostic approaches to robust control [3,4].
Because we are able to know the distribution of the
noises in our system, using them in the selection of op-
timal gains allows us to exploit this known structure
for a tighter and more tailored result. The problem of
covariance-based ‖H‖2 design is, however, in general a
non-convex problem. To make it compatible with our
LMI framework, along the way we develop a novel con-
vexification of the OCC ‖H‖2 design problem, by divid-
ing the problem into two parts: a convex optimization
and a generalized algebraic Ricatti equation.
In [11] we presented the notion of observer gain design
to minimize the ellipsoidal bound on the estimation er-
ror. Here we complete the design problem by extending
the framework to quantify and minimize the reachable
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set of attack-induced states, importantly integrating the
design of the controller gain matrix as well. The more
recent work [10] provides a general and expansive frame-
work for using an LMI approach to solve the gain design
problem for security. Our work here is distinguished by
(a) using estimate feedback as opposed to a dynamic
controller, (b) using a covariance-informed ‖H‖2 perfor-
mance metric as opposed to a distributionally insensi-
tive version, and (c) introducing a magnification factor
to scale the shape matrices associated with the ‖H‖2
and reachable set decision variables. While the dynamic
controller - characterized by a linear time invariant dy-
namical system with matrices Ac, Bc, Cc, and Dc - used
in [10] is a more general approach, the nonlinearities
caused by the estimate-based feedback adds additional
complications to the steps to linearize the constraints.
In particular, if we define Ac, Bc, Cc, and Dc to en-
code estimate-based feedback, the resulting inequalities
in [10] are nonlinear and non-convex. The magnification
factor we introduce here is effectively assumed to be unit
value in [10]; in our numerical studies the value of this
parameter tends to be large, indicating that including
this factor greatly improves the quality of the optimiza-
tion solution. A conference paper [6] presented the re-
sults for the iterative approach we take here, however,
due to space the full detail of the proofs were not in-
cluded. The fully convexified approach is not present in
that paper.
2 Background
We consider a discrete-time linear time invariant (LTI)
system of the form
xk+1 = Fxk +Guk + νk, (1)
yk = Cxk + ηk, (2)
in which the state xk ∈ Rn, k ∈ N, evolves due to the
state update provided by the state matrix F ∈ Rn×n,
the control input uk ∈ Rm shaped by the input ma-
trix G ∈ Rn×m, and the i.i.d Gaussian system noise
νk ∼ N (0, R1), R1 ∈ Vn×n (V is the set of positive def-
inite matrices). The output yk ∈ Rp aggregates a linear
combination of the states, given by the observation ma-
trixC ∈ Rp×n, and the i.i.d Gaussian measurement noise
ηk ∼ N (0, R2), R2 ∈ Vp×p. For the simplicity of the ex-
position, we have considered Gaussian noises, however,
the approach we present is applicable for general noise
distributions. In addition we assume that F is stable, the
pair (F,C) is detectable, (F,G) is stabilizable and sys-
tem and measurement noises are mutually independent.
In this work, we consider the scenario that the actual
measurement yk can be corrupted by an attack, δk ∈ Rp.
The attack is injected at some point between the mea-
surement and reception of the output by the controller,
y¯k = yk + δk = Cxk + ηk + δk. (3)
If the attacker has access to the measurements, then
it is possible for the attack δk to cancel some or all of
the original measurement yk - so an additive attack can
achieve arbitrary control over the “effective” output of
the system.
Because our system is stochastic, we require an estimator
to produce a prediction of the system behavior
xˆk+1 = Fxˆk +Guk + L(y¯k − Cxˆk), (4)
where xˆk ∈ Rn is the estimated state and the observer
gain L is designed to force the estimate to track the
system states.
We consider observer-based feedback controllers
uk = Kxˆk, (5)
where K ∈ Rm×n is the controller gain matrix. Next, we
define the residual sequence
rk = y¯k − Cxˆk, (6)
as the difference between what we actually receive (y¯k)
and expect to receive (Cxˆk), which evolves according to
xk+1 = (F +GK)xk −GKek + νk
ek+1 =
(
F − LC)ek − Lηk + νk − Lδk,
rk = Cek + ηk + δk,
(7)
where ek = xk−xˆk is the estimation error. In the absence
of attacks (i.e., δk = 0), we can show that the steady-
state distribution of rk is Gaussian with covariance,
Σ = E[rkr
T
k ] = CE[eke
T
k ]C
T + E[ηkη
T
k ],
= CPeC
T +R2,
(8)
where the steady state covariance of the estimation error
Pe = limk→∞ Pk = limk→E[ekeTk ] is the solution of
Pe = (F − LC)Pe(F − LC)T + LR2LT +R1. (9)
In this work, we consider the chi-squared detector, al-
though similar analysis can be done with other detec-
tor choices [9,13]. The chi-squared detector constructs a
quadratic distance measure zk to be sensitive to changes
in the variance of the distribution as well as the expected
value,
zk = r
T
k Σ
−1rk. (10)
The chi-squared detector generates alarms when the dis-
tance measure exceeds a threshold α ∈ R>0{
zk ≤ α −→ no alarm,
zk > α −→ alarm: k′ = k, (11)
2
such that alarm time(s) k′ are produced. The Σ−1 factor
in the definition of zk re-scales the distribution (E[zk] =
p, E[zkz
T
k ] = 2p) so that the threshold α can be designed
independent of the specific statistics (mean and covari-
ance) of the noises νk and ηk; instead, it can be selected
simply based on the number of sensors, p [9].
2.1 Definition of Attack
Detectors are designed to identify anomalies in system
behavior. If an attacker aims to remain undetected, the
choice of detector and its parameters limit what the at-
tacker is able to accomplish. The type of attacks we con-
sider here require strong knowledge of and access to sys-
tem dynamics, statistics of the noises, current estimate
(xˆk), and the detector configuration. The goal of this
powerful stealthy attack is to construct the worst case
scenario to aid the design of more robust systems.
Zero-alarm attacks employ attack sequences that main-
tain the distance measure at or below the threshold of
detection, i.e., zk ≤ α. Hence, these attacks generate no
alarms. To satisfy this condition we define the attack as
δk = φk − (yk − Cxˆk) = −Cek − ηk + φk, (12)
where φk ∈ Rp is any vector such that φTk Σ−1φk ≤ α
(recall the attacker has access to the sensor, yk, and
knowledge of the estimator, xˆk). Based on this attack
strategy,
zk = r
T
k Σ
−1rk,
= (Cek + ηk + δk)
TΣ−1(Cek + ηk + δk),
= φTk Σ
−1φk ≤ α. (13)
Thus zk ≤ α and no alarms are raised.
2.2 Reachable Set
Under a stealthy zero-alarm attack (12), the attacked
system dynamics become
xk+1 = Fxk +GKxˆk + νk,
xˆk+1 = LCxk + (F +GK − LC)xˆk − LCek + Lφk,
ek+1 = Fek − Lφk + νk.
(14)
We stack these into a combined state ξk =
[
xTk , xˆ
T
k , e
T
k
]T
and combined input µk =
[
νTk , φ
T
k
]T
,
ξk+1 = Aξk +Bµk, (15)
with
A =

F GK 0
LC F +GK − LC −LC
0 0 F
 , B =

I 0
0 L
I −L
 .
(16)
Remark 1 The choice of including xk, xˆk, and ek seems
redundant at this point since ek = xk− xˆk, however, this
choice is crucial as we layer additional constraints into
the design optimization.
Throughout the rest of the paper we will use a selection
matrix Ex = [In, 0n×n, 0n×n] to pull out quantities rel-
evant to the state xk = Exξk.
The reachable set of attack-induced states is then,
R =
xk = Exξk
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ξk+1 = Aξk +Bµk,
ξ1 = 0, φ
T
k Σ
−1φk ≤ α,
νTk R
−1
1 νk ≤ ν¯, ∀k ∈ N
 , (17)
where the ellipsoidal bound on the attack φk is imposed
by the attacker’s desire to remain stealthy (13), and
the ellipsoidal bound on the noise is created by truncat-
ing the Gaussian system noise to a desired probability,
i.e., Pr[νTk R
−1
1 νk ≤ ν¯] = pν , where pν is some desired
(typically high) probability. In principle, the noise has
unbounded support, and hence the reachable set is un-
bounded. To ensure bounded reachable sets, we apply
this truncation at the desired confidence level.
3 LMI Approach to Design K and L
In the first section, we reframe an existing result more
concisely, which identifies a minimal outer ellipsoidal
bound on the set of states reachable by a stealthy (zero-
alarm) attacker. We then move to consider minimizing
this set further through the design of the feedback and
estimator gainsK and L. As has been discussed in previ-
ous studies, a trivial solution exists to this design prob-
lem - to make either GK = 0 or L = 0. Doing so cuts the
feedback loop and guarantees that corrupted measure-
ments do not impact the system state. Simultaneously,
this destroys the purpose - more specifically the perfor-
mance - of the feedback loop. While many performance
metrics could be used, in Section 3.2 we impose a ‖H‖2
constraint to avoid these trivial solutions. Unlike prior
work where the performance criteria ignored the distri-
bution of the noise, this ‖H‖2 constraint is specific to
the covariance of the noise, thereby allowing our design
optimization to leverage this important knowledge. This
output covariance constrained (OCC) ‖H‖2 constraint
is non-convex; to our knowledge, this paper offers the
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first convexification of the OCC ‖H‖2 criteria into an
LMI framework.
3.1 Bounding Ellipsoid LMI (given K and L)
Before we move on to the synthesis problem of designing
the gain matrices, we first provide a solution to the anal-
ysis problem of finding a tight outer ellipsoidal bound
of the reachable set given K and L, when the system is
driven by the system noise and attack. A similar analysis
result appears in [5], however, there the problem is split
into two optimizations - one to find a bound on the es-
timation error reachable set, the result of which is used
in the second optimization to bound the state reachable
set. Here, in Lemma 2, we solve these simultaneously
through the stacked states ξk and inputs µk. The fol-
lowing lemma provides a bound on a Lyapunov-inspired
function given an elliptically bounded input.
Lemma 1 [10] Let Vk be a positive definite function with
V1 = 0 and µ
T
ikWiµik ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , N , where Wi is
positive definite. If there exists a constant a ∈ (0, 1) and
ai ∈ (0, 1) such that
∑N
i=1 ai ≥ a and
Vk+1 − aVk −
N∑
i=1
(1− ai)µTikWiµik ≤ 0, (18)
then Vk ≤ N−a1−a .
When we select the positive definite Vk to be a quadratic
function of the state, the result above provides an outer
ellipsoidal bound on the reachable states. We will use
the notation E(Q) = {x | xTQ−1x ≤ 1}.
Lemma 2 Given the stacked system matrices A and B
in (16), gain matrices K, L, detector threshold α with
steady state residual covariance Σ, system noise trunca-
tion threshold ν¯ with covariance R1, if there exists con-
stants a ∈ [0, 1), the solution of
min
a1,a2,Q
tr(ETxQEx)
s.t. 0 ≤ a1, a2 < 1, a1 + a2 ≥ a,
aQ QAT 0
AQ Q B
0 BT 1−a2−aW
 ≥ 0,
(19)
provides the shape matrix Q of the ellipsoidal bound on
the reachable set of states, i.e., R ⊆ E(ETxQEx), where
W =
[
1−a1
ν¯ R
−1
1 0
0 (1− a2)Π
]
, Π =
Σ−1
α
. (20)
Proof: The stacked dynamics (15) is driven by two inputs
which are both ellipsoidally bounded. LettingW1 = R
−1
1
and W2 = Σ
−1, (18) becomes
Vk+1 − aVk − 1− b
α
φTk Σ
−1φk − 1− a1
ν¯
νTk R
−1
1 νk ≤ 0.
(21)
Substituting the choice Vk = ξ
T
k
(
2−a
1−aP
)
ξk ≤ 2−a1−a , P >
0, into this equation and expanding using the dynamics
(15) results in the LMI,
H =

aP ATP 0
PA P PB
0 BTP 1−a2−aW
 ≥ 0, (22)
where P is the inverse of the shape matrix of the ellip-
soidal bound for the ξ reachable set (P−1 = Q), such
that the first block ETxQEx is the shape matrix of the
ellipsoidal bound of the reachable set of system states.
To make this ellipsoidal bound tight (as small as pos-
sible), the cost is selected to minimize the trace of the
shape matrix ETxQEx. To use Q as the variable of the
optimization instead of P we apply the transformation
T = diag [Q, Q, In], to (22), i.e., TTHT , which results
in the LMI in (19). 
Remark 2 For any convex shape (i.e., reachable set)
there are an infinite number of tight outer ellipsoidal
bounds. These different ellipsoids can be visualized as
being tangent to the reachable set at different points.
The minimum trace objective minimizes the sum of the
squared principal axes, which tends to avoid solutions
with, for example, low volume but one large principal axis.
Remark 3 Note that the parameter a is not a decision
variable of the optimization in (19). It appears nonlin-
early (multiplying Q). Since a belongs to a compact in-
terval, the conventional choice is to solve (19) across a
grid search in a and select the minimal, feasible solution.
3.2 Output Covariance Constrained ‖H‖2 Constraint
The introduction of this section and past related work
has identified that trivial solutions exist for the synthesis
problem unless a performance criteria is imposed in the
optimization [11,10]. One of the distinguishing features
of this work is that we consider an output covariance con-
strained ‖H‖2 constraint, which involves the covariances
of the system and sensor noises. The challenge, tackled in
the next subsection, is to convexify and linearlize this in-
herently nonlinear constraint. Most optimizations in the
literature either use a distributionally robust constraint
that is already convex [10,3] or solve the OCC ‖H‖2 us-
ing iterative algorithms [15,14]. To specify the perfor-
mance, Robust Control, in general, studies the gain ob-
served in the signal hk = H1xk + H2ηk + H3νk. Here,
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for the system without attack, we consider the system
driven by system and measurement noise and enforce an
‖H‖2 constraint between the output hk = yk and exci-
tation ωk =
[
νTk , η
T
k
]T
, making H1 = C, H2 = Ip×p,
and H3 = 0p×n.
When there is no attack the system evolves according to
xk+1 = Fxk +GKxˆk + νk, (23)
xˆk+1 = LCxk + (F +GK − LC)xˆk + Lηk, (24)
yk = Cxk + ηk, (25)
which can be combined using the stacked state ζk =
Exxˆξk =
[
xTk , xˆ
T
k
]T
,
ζk+1 = Aˆζk + Bˆωk, (26)
with Exxˆ = [I2n, 02n×n] making Aˆ = ExxˆAETxxˆ and
Bˆ = ExxˆBE
T
xxˆ.
Remark 4 It is here that we can start to appreciate the
value of the seemingly redundant definition of ξk (see Re-
mark 1). By doing so, the state matrix without attack Aˆ
can be expressed as a sub-block of the state matrix under
attack A. Establishing this parallel structure is key to-
wards being able to integrate the ‖H‖2 constraint (without
attack) with the reachable set calculation (under attack).
The OCC ||H||2 criteria specifies the gain from the noise
to the output should be less than a desired value γ¯,
lim
N→∞
√√√√ 1N ∑Nk=1 yTk yk
1
N
∑N
k=1 ω
T
k ωk
=
√
E[yTk yk]
E[ωTk ωk]
≤ γ¯. (27)
Lemma 3 Given the dynamics in (26), the OCC ‖H‖2
constraint in (27) is satisfied if the steady state covariance
P =
[
Px Pxxˆ
PTxxˆ Pxˆ
]
= lim
k→∞
Pk = lim
k→∞
E[ζkζ
T
k ], (28)
satisfies the Lyapunov equation
P = AˆPAˆT + Rˆ, P ≥ 0, (29)
and the following convex inequality holds,
Ch = tr
(
EˆTx C
TCEˆxP
)
+ tr(R2)
− γ¯2(tr(R1) + tr(R2)) ≤ 0, (30)
where Eˆx = [In, 0n×n].
Proof: From (25) and the definition of ωk, we can calcu-
late the quadratic terms in (27),
yTk yk = x
T
kC
TCxk + 2x
T
kC
T ηk + η
T
k ηk, (31)
ωTk ωk = ν
T
k νk + η
T
k ηk. (32)
Taking the expectation (xk and ηk are independent),
E[yTk yk] = E[x
T
kC
TCxk] + E[η
T
k ηk]
= tr
(
CTC E[xkx
T
k ]
)
+ tr(R2),
(33)
and similarly,
E[ωTk ωk] = E[ν
T
k νk]+E[η
T
k ηk] = tr(R1)+tr(R2). (34)
The unknown quantity is then the covariance of the
state, E[xkx
T
k ], which is the first block of the stacked
state ζk covariance Pk = E[ζkζ
T
k ]. This covariance fol-
lows the update, evaluating E[ζk+1ζ
T
k+1] with (26),
Pk+1 = AˆPkAˆ
T + Rˆ, Rˆ =
[
R1 0
0 LR2L
T
]
. (35)
Because the matrix Aˆ is stable the covariance converges
to a steady value limk→∞Pk = P which satisfies the
Lyapunov equation (29). Combining this P with (33)-
(34) the ‖H‖2 constraint becomes
γ =
√
tr
(
CPxCT
)
+ tr(R2)
tr(R2) + tr(R1)
≤ γ¯, (36)
where γ is the actual performance and γ¯ is the worst al-
lowable performance. Rearranging this leads to the con-
dition (30). 
In order to use this ‖H‖2 constraint in a convex op-
timization we need to linearize the Lyapunov equation
constraint. We state this result as part of a complete
convex optimization problem to design the gains K and
L to achieve the optimal (smallest) ‖H‖2 gain.
Theorem 1 Given the dynamics in (26), the smallest
output covariance constrained ‖H‖2 gain defined by (27)
is
γ∗ =
√
tr
(
CP∗xCT
)
+ tr(R2)
tr(R2) + tr(R1)
, (37)
where P∗x is the solution of{
min
Px,Q1,X,Y,Z
tr(CPxC
T )
s.t. CL ≥ 0,
(38)
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with
CL =

Q1 I Q1F +XC Z Q1R1 XR2
∗ Px F FPx +GY R1 0
∗ ∗ Q1 I 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ Px 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ R1 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ R2

. (39)
There exists at most
(
2n
n
)
distinct real-valued, control
gains L = Q−112 X, K = YP
−T
xxˆ satisfying γ = γ
∗, where
Pxxˆ = (I − PxQ1)Q−T12 and Q12 is the solution of fol-
lowing generalized algebraic Ricatti equation,
Q12Γ1Q12 + Q12Γ2 + Γ3Q12 + Γ4 = 0, (40)
with known matrices
Γ1 = GY (I −Q1Px)−1, (41)
Γ2 = F,
Γ3 = (Q1GY +XCPx + Q1FPx − Z)(I −Q1Px)−1,
Γ4 = −XC.
Proof: The formula for the optimal gain γ∗, (37), comes
naturally from the ‖H‖2 bound derived in (36). Since
all other terms are constant, minimizing tr(CPxC
T ) is
equivalent to minimizing the gain. This covariance is
constrained by the Lyapunov equation in (29). Here,
which is a standard technique for incorporating Lya-
punov equations into convex optimizations, we replace
this equality constraint with the very similar inequality,
P− AˆPAˆT − Rˆ ≥ 0, P ≥ 0. (42)
We can now combine these two inequality constraints
into one using the Schur complement [1],
C =
[
P− Rˆ AˆP
PAˆT P
]
≥ 0. (43)
This relaxation is justified because the objective func-
tion tr(CPxC
T ) minimizes the decision variable P and
drives the optimization to the bound of the inequality,
which would yield equality - hence driving the relaxed
form (42) to the equality (29) (see Appendix A).
We use the following transformation to linearize C,
CL =
[
T1
T1
]T
C
[
T1
T1
]
=
[
PL −RL AˆL
AˆTL PL
]
, (44)
with
T1 =
[
Q1 I
QT12 0
]
, P−1 = Q =
[
Q1 Q12
QT12 Q2
]
, (45)
and
PL = T
T
1 PT1 =
[
Q1 I
I Px
]
, (46)
RL = T
T
1 RT1 =
[
Q1R1Q1 + Q12LR2L
TQT12 Q1R1
R1Q1 R1
]
,
AˆL = T
T
1 AˆPT1 =
[
Q1F +XC Z
F FPx +GY
]
,
where X, Y , and Z are defined as
X = Q12L, (47)
Y = KPTxxˆ, (48)
Z = Q1FPx +XCPx + Q1GY + Q12FP
T
xxˆ (49)
+ Q12GY −XCPTxxˆ.
The term PL−RL can be linearized by applying a Schur
complement to recover CL in (39). This transformation
changes the set of decision variables from (Px, Pxˆ, Pxxˆ,
L, K) to (Px, Q1, X, Z, Y ). The solution in these new
decision variables is then used to calculate Pxxˆ and Q12
using (49) and the identity
PxQ1 + PxxˆQ
T
12 = I, (50)
which comes from the first block of the definition PQ =
I. The definition of Z in (49) and (50) combine to form
the general algebraic Ricatti equation (40), which, in
general, has
(
2n
n
)
different answers. Finally, the gain ma-
trices can be found by, L = Q−112 X and K = YP
−T
xxˆ .
Note that the solutions to the original Lyapunov equal-
ity (29) are a subset of the solutions of the relaxed in-
equality (42); so Theorem 1 characterizes all OCC ‖H‖2
optimal solutions. 
At the other end of the performance spectrum, security
increases (size of the reachable set decreases) as either
L or GK approach zero. This represents worst-case per-
formance (without closed loop control) and the corre-
sponding value of γ = γ0 can be found using Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 Given the system dynamics (23) and (24),
the open loop (i.e., L = 0 or GK = 0) OCC ‖H‖2 gain
γ0 is given by
γ0 =
√
tr
(
CPxCT
)
+ tr(R2)
tr(R2) + tr(R1)
, (51)
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where the steady state covariance of state Px is the solu-
tion of
FPxF
T −Px +R1 = 0. (52)
Proof. For both L = 0 or GK = 0, the state dynamics
(23) are in open loop and thus the evolution of the system
is the same. WhenL = 0, the state estimate xˆk converges
to zero because the system is open loop stable and the
open loop state dynamic becomes
xk+1 = Fxk + νk. (53)
Similarly, when GK = 0, equation (23) becomes (53) di-
rectly. With this state equation, the steady state covari-
ance of the state, Px, is given by (52) and consequently
the desired performance γ0 should be the same in both
cases. 
Therefore, now entering into the design process, for all
choices of γ¯ ∈ [γ∗, ∞], the solution for performance
γ < γ¯ always lies within the trade-off interval,
γ∗ ≤ γ ≤ γ0. (54)
3.3 Bounding ellipsoid LMI (designing K and L)
The goal of this paper is to construct an optimization to
design K and L such that the impact of an attacker on
the reachable states is minimized. However, whenK and
L are considered variables of the Lemma 2 optimization,
(22), and therefore, (19) contains nonlinear terms. In
the sections that follow, we impose some structure on
the solution so that we can linearize the overall design
problem. Each choice will be motivated individually, but
it is also the combined effect of the these structures taken
together that yield the final linear matrix inequality.
The first three (out of four) represent a choice of how to
select an outer ellipsoidal bound. While they do impose
some structure on the solution, they are best seen as one
choice out of infinitely many equally good options, so
they are not very limiting.
Imposed Structure 1 There are an infinite number of
tight outer ellipsoidal bounds of the stacked state ξ. Of
these we select one that satisfies the following structure
for the inverse of the shape matrix,
P =

P1 P12
PT12 P2
P3
 , (55)
which assumes the independence of the ellipsoidal bound
on the estimation error ek from the ellipsoidal bound on
the combined state xk and estimate xˆk. This is inspired by
a similar assumption made in [10]. This selection enables
us to utilize the parallel dynamics with and without attack
(see Remarks 1 and 4) and linearize the original LMI
with respect to K and L.
This selection also permits inverting each block sepa-
rately, such that P−13 = Qe and[
P1 P12
PT12 P2
]−1
=
[
Qx Qxxˆ
QTxxˆ Qxˆ
]
. (56)
Consider the linearizing change of coordinates used in
[4,10],
T2 =

T3
T3
In
 , T3 =

Qx I 0
QTxxˆ 0 0
0 0 I
 . (57)
Although (22) is not entirely linearized with this trans-
formation, due to the presence of term Σ which depends
on L, we will introduce an iterative approach later to
avoid this nonlinearity. The LMI H, (22), becomes
HL = TT2 HT2 =

aPL ATL 0
AL PL BL
0 BTL
1−a
2−aW
 , (58)
where
PL = TT3 PT3 =

Qx I 0
I P1 0
0 0 P3
 , (59)
BL = T
T
3 PB =

I 0
P1 Y1
P3 −P3L
 ,
AL = T
T
3 PAT3 =

FQx +GX1 F 0
Z1 P1F + Y1C −Y1C
0 0 P3F
 ,
Y1 = P12L, X1 = KQTxxˆ,
Z1 = P1FQx + P12LCQx + P1GKQTxxˆ + P12FQTxxˆ
+ P12GKQTxxˆ − P12LCQTxxˆ.
One of the useful features of this transformation is that
Qx = ETxQEx, the quantify used in the objective func-
tion of Lemma 2, appears as a variable of the LMI. This
section provides the linearization necessary to separate
the gains K and L as variables in Lemma 2 (and could
then be used as the starting point if a different perfor-
mance criteria was used, as opposed to the ‖H‖2 con-
straint considered in this paper).
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Figure 1. The reachable set (gray) is approximated by el-
lipsoids with shape matrix σP. Without relaxation effects,
the role of σ is to identify the tight approximation (green),
where σ = σ∗. When σ < σ∗ the optimization will be infea-
sible or doesn’t converge, because the red ellipsoid cannot
contain the reachable set. When σ > σ∗ the black ellipsoid
loosely contains the reachable set. Due to our techniques to
linearize the optimization, the reachable set approximation
will have some extra conservatism and we do not expect the
optimal ellipsoid to be exactly tangent.
3.4 Combining Performance and Security
In this work, we design the controller and estimator gains
to minimize the impact of attacks on the system state,
which is measured by an outer ellipsoidal bound on the
reachable states when the system is driven by the attack
and system noise. As Remark 2 states, there are an in-
finite number of potential outer bounding - and tight -
ellipsoids. In order to combine the LMI constraints from
the reachable set and ‖H‖2 calculations, we make a spe-
cific choice about the outer ellipsoidal bound we select.
Imposed Structure 2 We select the shape matrix of
the ellipsoidal bound of the states xk and estimate xˆk
under attack ETxxˆQExxˆ - see (56) - to have the same
orientation as the covariance of the states and estimate
without attack (ζk),
σP = ETxxˆQExxˆ, (60)
where σ is a scaling factor that becomes a new variable
of the method and is a function of gains (L, K). Since
Q = P−1, this sets up a common set of variables to link
the ‖H‖2 (left) and ellipsoidal bound (right) constraints,
σ
[
Px Pxxˆ
PTxxˆ Pxˆ
]
=
[
Qx Qxxˆ
QTxxˆ Qxˆ
]
,
1
σ
[
Q1 Q12
QT12 Q2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
‖H‖2
=
[
P1 P12
PT12 P2
]
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(Q)
(61)
The structure above allows us to replace variables in the
ellipsoidal bound optimization Q and P with quantities
from the performance criteria, P and Q, respectively.
Based on (61) we can link the variables of the bounding
Algorithm 1: K,L = Theorem 2(F,G,C,R1, R2)
L← such that CL ≥ 0 is feasible
σ ←∞
while true do
if (64) is infeasible then break
Px,Q1, X, Y, Z ← (64)
K,L ← real solutions of Ricatti eqn (40)
(K˜, L˜)← select pair (K,L) ∈ (K,L) by smallest
Lemma 2 objective value
if ‖L− L˜‖ ≤  then σ ← σ − ε
else K,L← K˜, L˜
end
ellipsoid LMI with the ‖H‖2 constraint,
X = σY1 = Q12L, Y =
X1
σ
= KPTxxˆ, (62)
Z = Z1 = Q1FPx +XCPx + Q1GY + Q12FP
T
xxˆ
+ Q12GY −XCPTxxˆ.
Now we can rewrite AL, BL , PL based on Px, Q1, P3,
X, Y , Z,
AL =

σ(FPx +GY ) F 0
Z 1σ (Q1F +XC) − 1σXC
0 0 P3F
 ,
BL =

I 0
1
σQ1
1
σX
P3 −P3L
 , PL =

σPx I 0
I 1σQ1 0
0 0 P3
 .
(63)
Thus the choice in (60) has facilitated integrating these
optimizations.
Theorem 2 Consider a LTI system (1) with maxi-
mum allowable output covariance constrained ‖H‖2
gain γ¯ (27), chi-squared detector threshold α (11) and
zero-alarm stealthy attacker (13). Algorithm 1 returns
(approximately) optimal controller K∗ and observer L∗
gains to minimize the reachable set of states possible by
the attacker, while maintaining an OCC ‖H‖2 gain no
bigger than γ¯. Algorithm 1 uses the Ricatti equation (40)
to update L based on the solution of the combined convex
optimization problem which has a solution if for some
a ∈ [0, 1),
min
a1,a2,Px,Q1,
X,Y,Z,P3
tr(σPx)
s.t. 0 ≤ a1, a2 < 1, a1 + a2 ≥ a,
HL ≥ 0,
Ch ≤ 0, CL ≥ 0.
(64)
Proof: In the past sections we have linearized the LMIs
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associated with the ellipsoidal outer bound on the reach-
able set (HL) and with the ‖H‖2 constraint (Ch and CL)
and finally made a structural connection between these
two optimizations (61) to use a common set of decision
variables. Because the controller gain K appears within
the decision variables of the optimization, we implicitly
optimize K.
There are two remaining challenges to be addressed by
this algorithm. First, L appears, as K does, implicitly
in the decision variables, but also explicitly in the non-
linear term P3L in matrix BL and in the dependence of
covariance Σ in matrix W on L (8), both of which are in
HL. Second, the magnification factor σ multiplies most
of the decision variables of the optimization. Thus nei-
ther L nor σ can be taken as variable in the optimiza-
tion. We solve this by applying an iterative algorithm
over both L and σ that leverages the structure presented
in Figure 1. If we select a large enough value for the
magnification parameter σ, any choice of L easily satis-
fies HL by creating a very large ellipsoidal outer bound.
We satisfy the other constraints of the optimization (the
‖H‖2 constraints) by selecting the initial value for L as
the ‖H‖2 optimal L (from Theorem 1), hence satisfying
Ch and CL. For these fixed values of σ, L, and Σ, the
optimization (64) is solved. The solution then provides
a new value of L - solved from the Ricatti equation in
(40) - that minimizes the ellipsoidal bound while satis-
fying all constraints. Using the same value for σ but the
updated L (and hence updated Σ), optimization (64) is
again solved, yielding another value for L. This itera-
tion is repeated until L has sufficiently converged. Once
convergence is achieved, σ is reduced and the process is
repeated with the existing L as the initial value for the
L iteration. At some point, the magnification factor σ
will be too small for any choice of L to permit the ellip-
soidal bound to contain the reachable set, hence the op-
timization (64) will become infeasible. This is the stop-
ping condition for the algorithm.
Note that the convergence criteria for L and the decre-
ment amount for σ are selected by the user. In principle,
these should be small, but making them larger will allow
the algorithm to require fewer iterations. The number of
iterations for L to converge tends to be quite small (typ-
ically 2-3). In practice, the decrement of σ can also be
accomplished through a bisection algorithm which looks
for the smallest value of σ that makes the optimization
(64) feasible.
Recall that, in general, solving the Ricatti equation (40)
yields up to
(
2n
n
)
solutions. We assert that there will
always exist at least one real solution due to matrices
PL, P, CL, and C being positive definite. To chose be-
tween the real solutions, we choose the one that yields
the smallest ellipsoidal outer bound, as determined by
Lemma 2 (which provides a tighter approximation of the
reachable set, since it does not require the additional
linearization steps).
Finally, the stability of the closed loop system is implic-
itly guaranteed ifHL > 0 and CL > 0 (see Appendix B).

Remark 5 In practice, the quality of the solution is re-
lated to the initial guess for L. For the cases where γ¯ is
close to γ∗ we use L from Theorem 1 as the initial guess.
Otherwise when γ¯ is far from γ∗ we solve the problem in
multiple steps increasing γ¯ gradually from γ∗ at each step
solving Theorem 2 and using its solution as the initial
values for the next step where γ¯ is increased.
4 Resolving the Nonlinearity
The approach offered in Theorem 2 relies on an itera-
tive scheme to avoid the nonlinearities surrounding the
observer gain matrix L. In each iteration, the solution
of the convex optimization in (64) is used to find L us-
ing the Ricatti equation in (40) and the corresponding
residual covariance Σ using the Lyapunov equation in
(9). To eliminate the iterative approach, both of these
nonlinearities must be linearized and absorbed into the
convex optimization. A final nonlinearity is the existance
of the −P3L term within HL - specifically BL in (63).
We accomplish this linearization through the careful se-
lection of additional structure, which we will show only
marginally reduces the quality of the solutions found.
Imposed Structure 3 Here Qe = P−13 is the shape
matrix of the estimation error bounding ellipsoid. Again
there are an infinite number of choices for its orienta-
tion and, following the same approach taken in Imposed
Structure 2, here we choose the orientation that matches
that of the estimation error covariance in the absence of
attack P3 = 1σP−1e .
Imposed Structure 4 The final linearization assump-
tion is to search for solutions on the manifold that sat-
isfies Pxˆ = Pxxˆ. This is the most restrictive of the four
structures that have been imposed to linearize the prob-
lem, however, we will see it does not greatly impact the
conservatism of the optimization. One of the direct effects
of this structure is that the generalized algebraic Ricatti
equation (40), one of the key nonlinearities, is directly
linearized. However, it is this final structure that ulti-
mately removes all three nonlinearities present in Theo-
rem 2.
From Imposed Structure 4 and the identity PQ = I -
see (45) - we can show that P−1e = Q1 = −Q12 (see
Appendix C). The relationship between Q1 and Q12 is
primarily what linearizes the Ricatti equation in (40).
The relationship between Pe and Q1, combined with Im-
posed structure 3, enables us to replace the −P3L non-
linearity with 1σX. Therefore we can re-write matrices
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AL, BL,PL as,
AL =

σ(FPx +GY ) F 0
Z 1σ (Q1F +XC) − 1σXC
0 0 1σQ1F
 ,
BL =

I 0
1
σQ1
1
σX
1
σQ1
1
σX
 , PL =

σPx I 0
I 1σQ1 0
0 0 1σQ1
 .
(65)
Finally, the relationship between Pe and Q1 also help to
integrate the Lyapunov equation in (9) into the convex
optimization. Lemma 5 relates the matrix Π = Σ−1/α
with the existing decision variables. This requires us, like
the system and sensor noises, to truncate the estimation
error distribution at some confidence level, measured by
e¯.
Lemma 5 Consider the truncated Gaussian system
noise and measurement noise with νTk R
−1
1 νk ≤ ν¯ and
ηTk R
−1
2 ηk ≤ η¯ and their corresponding Gaussian es-
timation error and residual with eTkP
−1
e ek ≤ e¯ and
rTk Πrk ≤ 1. The positive definite matrix Π, can be ex-
pressed as Π = Σ
−1
α where Σ comes from (8) and (9), if,
XL =
[
Q1 − (e¯+ η¯)CTΠC −(e¯+ η¯)CTΠ
−(e¯+ η¯)ΠC R−12 − (e¯+ η¯)Π
]
≥ 0.
(66)
SL =

Q1 Q1F +XC Q1R1 XR2
(Q1F +XC)
T Q1 0 0
R1Q1 0 R1 0
R2X
T 0 0 R2
 ≥ 0.
(67)
where e¯ is computed from the lower incomplete Gamma
function such that Pr[eTkP
−1
e ek ≤ e¯] = pe, and pe is the
desired trucation probability.
Proof: The inequalityHL already provides a lower bound
on Π. We now add an additional upper constraint to
sandwich and fully constrain Π. We exploit the fact that
rTk Πrk ≤ 1, and rk = Cek + ηk, therefore we conclude,
Φ1 =
[
eTk η
T
k
] [CTΠC CTΠ
ΠC Π
][
ek
ηk
]
≤ 1. (68)
In addition, for the estimation error in the absence of
attack we have, eTkP
−1
e ek ≤ e¯, where e¯ is chosen to
contain most of the Gaussian estimation error distribu-
tion (this quadratic form follows a chi-squared distribu-
tion, therefore, e¯ can be chosen by the lower incomplete
Gamma function). For the measurement noise we have,
ηTk R
−1
2 ηk ≤ η¯, therefore, together we have
Φ2 =
[
eTk η
T
k
] [P−1e 0
0 R−12
][
ek
ηk
]
≤ e¯+ η¯. (69)
Hence, we can provide a upper bound for Π since Φ1 ≤ 1,
then (e¯+ η¯)Φ1 ≤ Φ2. Thus,[
P−1e − (e¯+ η¯)CTΠC −(e¯+ η¯)CTΠ
−(e¯+ η¯)ΠC R−12 − (e¯+ η¯)Π
]
≥ 0 (70)
which can be written as (66). We now have a upper
bound on Π in terms of Q1, however, Q1 is not itself
constrained. To do this, we relax the Lyapunov equation
(9) equality to inequality,
Pe− (F −LC)Pe(F −LC)T −R1−LR2LT ≥ 0. (71)
We apply the Schur Complement to receive
S =
[
Pe − LR2LT −R1 (F − LC)Pe
Pe(F − LC)T Pe
]
≥ 0. (72)
Using the transformation T4 = diag
[
P−1e P
−1
e
]
gives
SL = T4STT4 =
[
PeL −ReL AeL
ATeL PeL
]
≥ 0, (73)
where,
PeL = P
−1
e = Q1, (74)
ReL = P
−1
e (R1 + LR2L
T )P−1e = Q1R1Q1 +XR2X
T ,
AeL = P
−1
e (F − LC) = Q1F +XC.
Applying the Schur Complement again yields the ex-
pression in (67). 
With these combined linearization steps, we can provide
Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 Consider a LTI system (1) with desired out-
put covariance constrained ‖H‖2 gain γ¯ (27), chi-squared
detector thresholdα (11) and zero-alarm stealthy attacker
(13). If there exist a, a2 ∈ [0, 1) then the solution of the
following convex optimization provides the optimal ob-
server L and controller K gain matrices that minimize
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the set of states reachable by an attacker while maintain-
ing an OCC ‖H‖2 gain no bigger than γ¯,
min
a1,Px,Q1,Π
X,Y,Z
tr(σPx)
s.t. 0 ≤ a1 < 1, a1 + a2 ≥ a,
HL ≥ 0, Ch ≤ 0, CL ≥ 0,
SL ≥ 0, XL ≥ 0.
(75)
This optimization is solved for a specific value of σ, which
is optimized through a bisection algorithm.
5 Case study
We consider a LTI system (with matrices given below)
for this study with the chi-squared detector tuned to a
false alarm rate A = 0.05 (5%), system noise truncated
with p¯ = 95%, and a worst acceptable OCC ‖H‖2 gain of
γ¯ = 8.75. We use CVX to solve the convex optimizations
[2].
F =
[
1.0444 −0.1409
0.3001 0.6327
]
, G =
[
2 3
1 1
]
, C =
[
2 2
1 2
]
,
R1 =
[
0.0183 −0.0218
−0.0218 0.0261
]
, R2 =
[
0.0018 0.0031
0.0031 0.0096
]
We start by computing the optimal OCC ‖H‖2 gain γ∗
using Theorem 1,
γ∗ =
√
tr
(
C Px CT
)
+ tr(R2)
tr(R2) + tr(R1)
= 1.5673. (76)
The solution for gain matricesL andK based on the gen-
eralized algebraic Ricatti equation (40), returns
(
4
2
)
= 6
different answers of which two are real valued. Of the
real solutions,
L =
[
1.0085 −0.9780
−0.0139 0.2664
]
, K =
[
0.1273 −2.0544
−0.4303 1.4190
]
,
(77)
provides the smallest reachable set according to Lemma
2. To examine the accuracy of Theorem 1, we compare
the state covariance that is the solution of the Lyapunov
equation (29) with the designed gains in (77), with the
decision variable Px of the optimization. In this case,
the (entry-wise) mean absolute error (MAE) between
these matrices is less than 0.00001, justifying that the
relaxed inequality in Theorem 1 recovers an exact Lya-
punov equation solution.
The open loop OCC ‖H‖2 gain is found using Lemma 4
to be,
γ0 =
√
tr
(
CTC Px
)
+ tr(R2)
tr(R2) + tr(R1)
= 10.1899. (78)
Next we use the iterative approach from Theorem 2 with
convergence criteria  = 0.03 for the gain matrix L.
We use bisection to find the smallest feasible σ (stop-
ping tolerance of 0.01), starting with σmin = 0.1 and
σmax = 10
6. In addition we increase γ¯ gradually from
γ∗ = 1.57 until γ¯ = 8.75 by steps of 0.1 (see Remark 5).
The optimal gains are,
L =
[
0.0956 −0.1248
−0.1010 0.1321
]
, K =
[
0.1440 −2.0390
−0.4441 1.4063
]
,
(79)
with corresponding magnification factor σ = 400.91.
Given these gains the actual performance is computed
as γ = 6.91, which is computed by substituting the opti-
mal gains into and then solving the Lyapunov equation
(29) and then computing γ from (36). This discrepancy
between the input γ¯ and the outcome γ is the price of the
linearization, caused by the competing LMI constraints
(see Appendix E).
Finally we optimize the gains L and K using the fully
convexified method in Theorem 3, which results in,
L =
[
0.1274 −0.1737
−0.2019 0.2872
]
, K =
[
0.1902 −1.9945
−0.4757 1.3759
]
.
(80)
The actual performance is γ = 6.81 (as above). The bi-
section is configured as above and returns σ = 2471.42 as
the smallest feasible value of the magnification factor. To
examine the accuracy of these linearization method we
compare the state covariance of the system which is the
solution of the Lyapunov equation (as discussed above)
with the designed gains in (80), with the decision vari-
able Px of the optimization. The mean absolute error
between these two matrices is 0.04. As before, this dis-
crepancy is the result of the linearization (see Appendix
D)
Figure 2 compares the ellipsoidal bounds provided by the
solutions above including Theorem 3 (red) and Theorem
2 (blue) for the worst allowable performance γ¯ = 8.75,
as well as Theorem 1 (black) for optimal performance
γ = γ∗. In this figure the ellipsoidal bounds are from
Lemma 2 with optimal gains provided from Theorem 3,
Theorem 2, and Theorem 1. This figure demonstrates
that despite the similarities between Robust Contol and
Resilient Control design, the ‖H‖2 optimal solution is
not the optimal security solution. It also shows that the
fully convexified solution evidences only marginally de-
graded solution quality, despite the linearization steps.
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Figure 2. A comparison between the ellipsoidal bounds of the
optimized reachable sets from Theorems 2 and 3 for desired
performance γ¯ = 8.75 along with that of the OCC ‖H‖2
optimal solution.
0 3 6 9 12
0
200
400
97.08
125.86
144.50
331.98
376.98
10.196.916.815.661.57
Figure 3. Performance-Security curve for the proposed it-
erative semi-definite optimization approach (dashed green)
compared with fully convexified version (green). The extra
steps taken to linearize the problem make the fully convex
optimization feasible only for a portion of the entire trade
off interval.
In Figure 3 we compute the optimal gains for a wide
range of worst allowable OCC ‖H‖2 gains using Theo-
rem 2 and Theorem 3. Given the optimal gains, L andK
for each, we plot the objective function of Lemma 2 with
respect to the actual performance, γ. We use the objec-
tive function of Lemma 2 as a proxy for security where,
smaller values imply better security. This plot demon-
strates that there is, indeed, a trade off between security
and performance. The nonlinearity and steep slope near
γ∗ indicates that dramatic improvements in security can
be gained by marginal concessions in performance. The
relationship between these two properties, captured by
this plot, should be used in resilient control system de-
sign.
Figure 3 shows that the solution of Theorem 3 does not
cover the entire trade off interval and the problem is in-
feasible on the interval γ ∈ [γ∗, γc], where γc = 5.66 for
this scenario. The manifold Pxˆ = Pxxˆ imposed by Im-
posed Structure 2 is not able to provide a feasible solu-
tion for entire trade off interval, satisfying both the sta-
bility constraint in both attacked system LMI (HL) and
attack free LMI (CL). There exists an infimum for the
optimal threshold on this manifold, which is computed
in Appendix D.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a set of tools to design the feedback
controller and observer gains for observer-based feed-
back control with the aim to minimize the effect sensor
falsification attacks. As past work has observed, there is
a necessary trade-off between ensuring performance and
minimizing the effect of the attacker. Here the attacker
impact is quantified as the set of states reachable through
the action of the attacker and the nominal closed-loop
performance is specified by an output covariance con-
strained ‖H‖2 gain. We frame this problem as an LMI
wrapped in an iterative algorithm as well as a fully con-
vexified optimization and a large part of the effort here is
to linearize the constraints involved. Along the way, we
also contribute a convex optimization to design optimal
OCC ‖H‖2 gains.
References
[1] S. Boyd, L. El Ghaoui, E. Feron, and V. Balakrishnan. Linear
Matrix Inequalities in System and Control Theory, volume 15
of Studies in Applied Mathematics. SIAM, Philadelphia, PA,
1994.
[2] Inc. CVX Research. CVX: Matlab software for disciplined
convex programming, version 2.0. http://cvxr.com/cvx,
August 2012.
[3] Maurıcio C De Oliveira, Jose´ C Geromel, and Jacques
Bernussou. Extended h 2 and h norm characterizations
and controller parametrizations for discrete-time systems.
International Journal of Control, 75(9):666–679, 2002.
[4] Jose´ C Geromel, Jacques Bernussou, and Maur´ıcio C
De Oliveira. H/sub 2/-norm optimization with constrained
dynamic output feedback controllers: decentralized and
reliable control. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
44(7):1449–1454, 1999.
[5] Navid Hashemi, Carlos Murguia, and Justin Ruths. A
comparison of stealthy sensor attacks on control systems. In
2018 Annual American Control Conference (ACC), pages
973–979. IEEE, 2018.
[6] Navid Hashemi and Justin Ruths. Gain design via lmis to
minimize the impact of stealthy attacks. In 2020 Annual
American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2020.
[7] Jezdimir Milosevic, David Umsonst, Henrik Sandberg, and
Karl Henrik Johansson. Quantifying the impact of cyber-
attack strategies for control systems equipped with an
anomaly detector. In 2018 European Control Conference
(ECC), pages 331–337. IEEE, 2018.
[8] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli. On the performance degradation
of cyber-physical systems under stealthy integrity attacks.
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 61:2618–2624,
2016.
[9] Carlos Murguia and Justin Ruths. On model-based detectors
for linear time-invariant stochastic systems under sensor
attacks. IET Control Theory & Applications, 13(8):1051–
1061, 2019.
12
[10] Carlos Murguia, Iman Shames, Justin Ruths, and Dragan
Nesˇic´. Security metrics and synthesis of secure control
systems. Automatica, 115:108757, 2020.
[11] Carlos Murguia, Nathan van de Wouw, and Justin Ruths.
Reachable sets of hidden cps sensor attacks: Analysis and
synthesis tools. In proceedings of the IFAC World Congress,
2016.
[12] Mario A Rotea. The generalized h2 control problem.
Automatica, 29(2):373–385, 1993.
[13] David Umsonst and Henrik Sandberg. Anomaly detector
metrics for sensor data attacks in control systems. In 2018
Annual American Control Conference (ACC), pages 153–
158. IEEE, 2018.
[14] Fangwei Xu, Kwan Ho Lee, and Biao Huang. Monitoring
control performance via structured closed-loop response
subject to output variance/covariance upper bound. Journal
of Process Control, 16(9):971–984, 2006.
[15] Guoming Zhu, MA Rotea, and R Skelton. A convergent
algorithm for the output covariance constraint control
problem. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization,
35(1):341–361, 1997.
A Validity of Relaxing the Lyapunov Equation
Here we show more precisely the objective function
tr(CPxC
T ) forces the relaxed inequality constraint (42)
to its boundary (equality), hence the optimization finds
a solution that satisfies the original Lyapunov equation
(29). To see this, consider the function,
f(P) = P− AˆPAˆT − Rˆ. (A.1)
and assume there exists matrices P ≥ 0 a solution to the
optimization (38) and P¯ ≥ 0 a solution of the Lyapunov
equation (29) such that,
f(P) = P− AˆPAˆT − Rˆ ≥ 0, (A.2)
f(P¯) = P¯− AˆP¯AˆT − Rˆ = 0. (A.3)
The difference f(P)−f(P¯) ≥ 0 is positive semi-definite,
so it also satisfies a Lyapunov equation with stable Aˆ
which means,
(P− P¯)− Aˆ(P− P¯)AˆT − R¯ = 0, (A.4)
for some R¯ ≥ 0. As the solution of a Lyapunov equation
the difference P− P¯ ≥ 0 is positive semi-definite, and so
the first block corresponding to the states Px − P¯x ≥ 0
is positive semi-definite. Thus,
CPxC
T ≥ CP¯xCT , (A.5)
tr(CPxC
T ) ≥ tr(CP¯xCT ). (A.6)
In the absence of no constraints other than CL, this
inequality demonstrates that if the objective function
tr(CPxC
T ) is minimized, that the solution satisfies
the Lyapunov equation (29), i.e., that the optimization
forces the inequality in (42) to equality.
B Proof of Stability
We show that the LMI constraints HL > 0 and CL > 0
imply that the attacked system and nominal system are
stable.
For HL, HL > 0 implies H > 0 which implies P > 0
and aP −ATPA > 0. Since a ∈ [0, 1), (1− a)P + aP −
ATPA = P − ATPA > 0. Thus, AT , and hence, A is
stable.
Similarly, for CL, CL > 0 implies C > 0 which implies
P > 0 and P−AˆPAˆT −Rˆ > 0. Therefore, P−AˆPAˆT >
0, which makes Aˆ stable as well.
C Manifold of Pxˆ = Pxxˆ
We know that PQ = I which means,
PxQ1 + PxxˆQ
T
12 = I (C.1)
PxQ12 + PxxˆQ2 = 0 (C.2)
PTxxˆQ1 + PxˆQ
T
12 = 0 (C.3)
PTxxˆQ12 + PxˆQ2 = I. (C.4)
if we assume the points located on manifold (Pxˆ = Pxxˆ),
Based on (C.3) we can conclude, Q1 = −Q12 and based
on (C.1) we have
Pxˆ = Px −Q−11 . (C.5)
Based on ek = xk − xˆk,
Pe = Px + Pxˆ −Pxxˆ −PTxxˆ, (C.6)
where on the mentioned manifold,
Pe = Px −Pxˆ. (C.7)
Comparing (C.5) and (C.7) we can conclude, P−1e = Q1.
D Infimum value of desired performance on the
manifold Pxˆ = Pxxˆ
To compute this infimum value, it suffices to introduce
τ = γ¯2, and obtain an optimal solution of τ from the
convex optimization,
min
a1,Px,Q1,Π
X,Y,Z,τ
τ
s.t. 0 ≤ a1 < 1, a1 + a2 ≥ a,
HL ≥ 0, Ch ≤ 0, CL ≥ 0,
SL ≥ 0, XL ≥ 0,
(D.1)
where a, a2 ∈ [0, 1] are introduced as a grid search vari-
ables. Here we have replaced the objective function that
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Figure E.1. Optimal performance versus specified perfor-
mance in the solutions of Theorem 2. In the vicinity of
γ = γ0, we see that γ¯ diverges.
minimizes the reachable set with an objective that min-
imizes γ¯ without penalty for increasing the reachable
set size (either through the direct decision variables or
through σ). The scaling factor σ for this optimization is
fixed as a large value (to make the optimization feasi-
ble, but there is no need to solve for the smallest value
of σ here). For this case, the optimal γ¯ = γ¯c = 7.75 and
then based on the optimal gains L and K the actual per-
formance is γc = 5.66. The jump at γc in Figure 3 is
because the system becomes marginally stability.
E Evaluation of optimal performance from The-
orem 2 and 3
The cost we pay for linearization in this work is that
the optimizations in Theorems 2 and 3, unlike Theorem
1, cannot guarantee that constraints Ch and CL meet
their boundary perfectly due to the addition of other
competing inequalities. Therefore, the solution of the
decision variable Px is slightly different from what would
be computed from the Lyapunov equation (29) using the
solution gains K and L. Consequently the performance
γ is different from γ¯. The Ch constraint, however, ensures
that the actual performance, γ, will be smaller than the
specified performance, γ¯.
Figure E.1 and Figure E.2 depict the difference between
γ and γ¯ in the iterative and fully convexified optimiza-
tions, respectively. In addition, these figures can be used
as a tool to determine what desired performance should
be imposed on the linearized problem in order to receive
expected performance in original nonlinear problem.
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Figure E.2. Optimal performance versus specified perfor-
mance in the solutions of Theorem 3. Here γ¯c = 7.75 and
γc = 5.66. In the vicinity of γ = γ0, we see that γ¯ diverges.
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